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However, a
relator’s initial complaint continues to be the operative
complaint for all non-intervened claims and relators remain a
party to the Government’s intervened claims and continue to have
rights to participate in those claims under 31 U.S.C. §
3730(c)(1) and to receive any relator’s recovery permitted by 31
U.S.C. § 3730(d), subject to the limitations of the FCA and the
facts and circumstances a particular case. Defendants can only
19
seek to have the Court limit relators’ participation pursuant to
31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(D).
Most other courts that have addressed this issue have
dismissed relators’ superseded claims. See, e.g. Feldman, 808
F. Supp. 2d at 649 (dismissing relator’s amended complaint for
lack of standing because it was “superseded in its entirety by
the Government’s Amended Complaint”); United States ex rel Magee
v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 09-324, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23295, at *8-*9 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 12, 2010) (same); United States
ex rel. Becker v. Tools & Metals, Inc., No. 3:05-CV-0627, 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27507, at *6, *17-*19 (N.D. Tex. March 31,
2009); In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., No.
01-12257, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89835, at *17 (D. Mass. Dec. 6,
2007) (“[O]nce the government has intervened, the relator has no
separate free-standing FCA cause of action.”) (citing United
States ex rel. Barajas v. Northrop Corp., 147 F.3d 905, 910 (9th
Cir. 1998))); but see United States ex rel. Landis v. Tailwind
Sports Corp., No. 10-cv-976, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83313 (D.D.C.
June 19, 2014), at *23-*28 (refusing to dismiss relators’
intervened claims on the basis that they no longer had standing
because the text of the FCA does not require it).